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holding that they may not apply state and local law regulating l· 
gambling to the ' on-reservation commercial gambling"" enterprises [ 
conducted by appees', which are primarily patronized by non-
Indians. 
DIS M~S ~ V\~ ~ 
M\~ce_ 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: The re 
that appee Tribes occupy reservations in California; ~he Cabazon 
and Morongo Tribes each conduct high-stakes bingo games for prof-
~-----------~--~ 
it on their reservation; the games are played predominantly by 
non-Indians, and are operated by non-Indian professional opera-
tors who receive a percentage of the profits. The profits are - -.....__ 
t-Javl' . the ~e source of income for the Tribes and the games provide 
the main source of employment for their members. The bingo games 
violate California law, which allows bingo only for charitable 
purposes, and then only if operated by members of the charitable 
organization and if jackpots do not exceed $250. The cabazons 11--
c~ 
~be also conducts poker games on its reservation, in violation 
of an ordinance promulgated by appnt Riverside County. 
~~h~(-(1~) "-'--~4 
A~s sued for declaratory and injunctive relief against 
appnt Riverside County, and appnt California interven~d. No in-----
dication as to any actual or threatened enforcement of state or 
county law is given in the CA9's opinion. The parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment on the question whether the 
state and county gambling laws apply on reservations. The DC 
granted summary judgment for appees' on that issue, and the CA9 
affirmed. 
First, the CA9 ruled that Public Law 83-280 did not make the 
state law applicable on reservations. Public Law 83-280 author-
izes the application of state criminal/prohibitory laws on reser-
vations, ~ n~t civil/regula~ la~s. Barona Group of Capitan 
Grande Band v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (CA9 1982). A state law is 
criminal/prohibitory if the activity the statute addresses vio-
lates public policy, and civil/regulat~ry if the activity does 
not violate public policy. Id. Barona specifically held that 
the California gambling law in question here i&_ civil/regulatory. 
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), does not compel a different 
conclusion. In Rice, the Court rejected a "substantive-
regulatory" distinction for purposes of 18 u.s.c. §1161, since 
neither the text nor history of the statute revealed such a dis-
tinction. Id., at 734, n. 18. Although the same could be said 
of Public Law 83-280, the Court has said of this law that it is 
to be liberally construed with doubt being resolved in favor of 
the Indians. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976). 
And Barona is binding precedent in the CA9. 
-------------------------+ 
Second, th~A9 held that the 0 ganized 
18 u.s.c. §1955, which incorporates by reference certain state 
gambling laws, and makes violation of them a federal offense, was 
l.._ 
ina~le. In _u_n_i_t_e_d_S_t_a_t_e_s_ v~Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (CA9 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 111~ .(1981), the CA9 held that a 
tribal activity violates the law of a state for purposes of the 
OCCA only if that activity is contrary to the public policy of 
the state. Thus, the same test applied for purposes of Public 
Law 83-280 applies for purposes of the OCCA, and the result is 
the same--state gambling law does not apply on the reservation. 
Finally, the CA9 considered whether ~al common lawJ al-
lowed application of the state gambling laws. This requires a 
"particularized inquiry" into the state, federal and tribal in-
terests at stake, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
u.s. 136, 142 (1980)), under which state laws may generally be 
applied to reservations unless this would (1) interfere with res-
ervation self-government, or (2) impair a right granted or re-
served by federal law. Rice, 463 U.S., at 718. Aside from the 
strong federal policy of encouraging tribal self-government and 
economic developnent, there is no federal law "preempting the 
determination of the applicabi 1 i ty of state and local gambling 
laws on Indian reservations." Pet. App. A-7. However, that does 
not end the inquiry, since state jurisdiction is also barred if 
it would impermissibly infringe on tribal sovereignty, which pro-
vides the "backdrop" against which federal policy and interests 
must be measured. White Mountain, 448 u.s., at 143. This re-
quires reference to "notions of sovereignty that have developed 
from historical traditions of tribal independence." Rice, 463 
u.s., at 719. Accordingly, the CA9 inquired whether application 
of the state gambling laws would interfere with reservation self-
government, under the federal common law inquiry outlined above. 
The state's interest is weak, the CA9 said, because its laws 
regulate only the operation of certain types of gambling, and do 
not make it a crime to participate in the gambling activities. 
Thus the state gambling laws are directed at the on-reservation 
conduct of the Tribes and not at the conduct of the non-Indians 
who gamble. Nor is there any evidence to support the state's 
asserted interest in prevent infiltration by organized crime. 
The federal interest is strong, the CA9 ruled, because of 
the federal policy of fostering tribal self-government and eco-
nomic development. The Dept. of the Interior is opposed to any 
legislation that would make tribal governments and Indians sub-
ject to state gambling laws on reservati9ns, as inconsistent with 
this federal policy. 
The CA9 then concluded that the Tribes' .- interest is also 
strong. It rejected appnts' contentions (1) that the tribes were 
"marketing an exemption" from state laws to non-Indians, and (2) 
that tribal tradition does not include commercial gambling. On 
the first point, the CA9 distinguished Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 u.s. 134 (1980), in which 
this Court held that Washington could impose a cigarette excise 
tax and a general sales tax on cigarette sales by on-reservation 
stores to non-Indians. Colville simply ruled that the state's 
interest in taxing these transactions outweighed the tribes' le-
gitimate interest in making those sales, and the Colville Court 
recognized that a tribe's interest in generating revenues "is 
strongest when the genera ted on 
the reservation by activities involving the Tribes." 447 U.S., 
at 157-157. That is true here and hence the tribal interest is -
strong; it outweighs the state's interest in protecting against 
the potential for organized crime. 
On the second point, the CA9 held that the proper focus in 
determining whether a tribal tradition exists should not be on 
whether the tribe historically engaged in a particular activity, 
but on whether the tribe is engaged in a traditional governmental 
function. Zoning and automobile registration, for example, are 
not historical tribal activities, but are among the traditional 
governmental functions now exercised by Indian tribes. See Crow 
Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (CA9 1981). 
In sum, the CA9 found that the fed~ral and tribal interests 
outweighed appnt' s interests in applying state law, and hence 
federal common law would not permit application_of these laws. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appnts challenge each aspect of the 
CA9's decision, but they concentrate on the "federal common law" 
holding. Appnts claim that the CA9's decision conflicts with 
Rice and Colville, which appnts describe as holding that "Indians 
do not have a sovereign right to market products to non-Indians, 
and that tribal economic interests do not outweigh legitimate 
state interests." Juris. Stmt. 7. The CA9' s decision allows 
Indian tribes to market to non-Indians a product--commercial gam-
bling--that the state prohibits. And the CA9 has defined tribal 
sovereignty too broadly, so that any profitable economic activity 
falls within the rubric of tribal sovereignty. This makes tribal 
sovereignty an absolute bar rather than a "backdrop." Rice, 463 
u.s., at 718. Moreover, the state's interest is strong both be-
cause the risk of infiltration by organized crime, and because 
the gambling is offered to non-Indians. The CA9 erred in treat-
ing the state's interest as weak because the incidence of the 
state regulation falls on the Indian operators of the gambling 
rather than on the non-Indian customers. The activity of gam-
bling obviously involves the non-Indian patrons on which the 
tribal games depend for revenue, and in Rice this Court upheld a 
state regulation that applied to Indian sellers rather than non-
Indian buyers. 
The CA9's decision also conflicts with Penebscot Nation v. 
Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 923, and 
Oklahoma v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.,2d 77 (Okla. 1985). In 
Penebscot, the Maine Sup Jud Ct, citing Colville, held that Maine (( 
can prohibit Indian commercial bingo games patronized by non-\\ 
Indians, and in Seneca-Cayuga the Okla Sup Ct ruled to the same 
effect. The CA9 did not mention either of these decisions, 
though both were cited to it. Since this Court dismissed 
Penebscot for want of a substantial federal question, 464 U.S. 
923, its disposition was on the merits, and binding on the CA9. 
See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 u.s. 332, 345 (1975). 
Additionally, appnts challenge the CA9' s interpretation of 
Public Law 83-280. Appnts find an anomaly created by apparently 
conflicting statements in Rice and Bryan: Bryan seems to inter-
pret Public Law 83-280 as providing less state jurisdiction than 
states have under the common law balancing test applied in Rice. 
Rice seems to cast doubt on the broad language in Bryan approving 
a distinction between regulatory and prohibitory laws. See 463 
u.s., at 734, n. 18. This Court should grant review to determine 
the relationship between the common law principles of Rice and 
the reach of Public Law 83-280. Moreover, nothing in the OCCA or 
its legislative history supports the CA9's extension of the regu-
latory/prohibitory distinction to that statute. 
Appees argue first that since this Court denied cert in 
Barona, and this case presents the same question concerning the 
applicability of California law to commercial gambling activities 
conducted by tribes on reservations, review is unwarranted. Sec-
ond, appees contend that this case is not a proper appeal under 
28 U.S.C. §1254(2), because the CA9 did not strike down any state 
law on constitutional or other grounds. As this Court 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 247 (1984), for pur-
poses of §1254(2) it has "consistently distinguished between 
those cases in which the state statute is expressly struck down 
on constitutional grounds and those in which an exercise of au-
thority under state law is invalidated without reference to the 
state statute." This Court should dismiss the appeal as improp-
er. 
Third, appees argue that this Court should not grant review 
because Congress is presently in the process of considering a 
bill that would protect tribal bingo games from state regulation. 
H.R. 1920, the bill in question, was favorably reported out by 
the House Interior Committee on Dec. 11, 1985, and passed by the 
House on Apr. 21, 1986. Senate Committee hearings are set for 
June 17, 1986. Appees quote from the congressional findings in 
H.R. 1920: "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate 
gaming activity on Indian lands which is not specifically prohib-
i ted by Federal law and which is conducted within a State which 
does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit 
such gaming activity." 
Fourth, appees dispute appnts' claim that Penobscot and Sen-
eca-Cayuga conflict with the CA9's decision here. Penobscot dis-
tinguished the CA9's decision in Barona, because the relationship 
between Indians and the State of Maine is unique, and the Maine 
Sup Jud Ct's decision is based on the Maine Indian Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1980. Moreover, neither Maine nor Oklahoma is a Pub-
lie Law 83-280 state, and the decision of the Okla Sup Ct re-
served final judgment on whether the st~te had jurisdiction over 
tribal bingo games. 
Fifth, appees find no conflict between Rice and Bryan, and 
they contend that the CA9 correctly determined that California 
has no public policy against gambling, in view of its tolerance 
of horse races and its promotion of state lotteries. Finally, 
appees argue that the CA9 applied the correct balancing test into 
the respective interests of the state, the federal government, 
and the tribes, and that its balancing of interests was also cor-
rect. This case is far closer to New Mexico v. Mescalaro Apache 
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983), than it is to Colville. And appees 
note that there is evidence in the record that in fact the tribes 
have historically sponsored gaming and gambling. 
Florida and some 20 other states have filed an amicus brief 
in support of appnts. Amici argue that the CA9 has improperly 
expanded the notion of tribal sovereignty by defining it in eco-
nomic terms rather than in terms of Indian conduct. 
4. DISCUSSION: The question whether this is a proper 
\~appeal is 
o"/ for puniti 
In Silkwood, an Oklahoma statute provided 
cases, and the Court of Appeals 
held that federal law preempted any award of punitive damages. 
This Court held that this amounted to an invalidation of the ex-
ercise of authority under state law, rather than invalidation of 
the statute itself, and hence that an appeal was improper under 
§1254(2). However, some reference to the purposes and provisions 
of state law was necessary to the CA9's decision here, but appar-
ently not to theCA's decision in Silkwood, see 464 u.s., at 247; 
that makes this case arguably distinguishable from Silkwood. On 
-Hu-...1<- ' 
balance, however, Ilthat this is not a proper appeal under -
Silkwood, and proceed on that assumption. 
The CA9's decision is a bit hard to follow. The CA9 did not 
hold that any federal treaty or statute preempts the application 
of state law prohibiting commercial gambling to the on-
reservation activities of appees. Juris. Stmt. App. A-6, n. 6. 
1-\ "' ~ Instead, the CA9 held that under federal common law, the state 
- cA-, 
laws may not be applied because "application of those laws would J 
interfere with reservation self-government." Id., at A-11. 
Thus, the CA9 necessarily determined that to apply state law here 
would "unlawfully infringe 'on the right of reservation Indians 
to make their own laws and be ruled by them.'" White Mountain 
~ Apache Tribe, 448 u.s., at 142. In so ruling, the CA9 relied on 
tk,;~ ~ a_!: an~ng test that looks to the state, federal, and trib~l 
~· · 1nterests at stake. This approach seems proper in view of Col-
n~r ~ ~ 
Y"' ville's statement that "[t]he principle of tribal self-
{TK. . 
~ 
government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in 
congressional policies, seeks an accomodation between the inter-
ests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, 
and those of the State, on the other." 447 u.s., at 156. 
The problem, however, lies in the CA9's application of this 
test, which seems arguably contrary to the "'trend •.• away from --
the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a[n independent] bar 
to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-
emption.'" Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, No. 84-
Colville stated that "Washington 
- .L.L -
does not infringe the right of reservation Indians to 'make their 
own laws and be ruled by them', merely because the result of im-
posing its taxes will be to deprive the Tribes __ of revenues which 
they currently are receiving." 447 u.s., at 156. I find the 
CA9's efforts to distinguish this case from that statement dubi-
ous. On the CA9's rationale, it 
oper:_te ~uses ~titut"3 
Indians, so long as the state did 
would seem that Indians could -
on the reservation for non-
not penalize sex with a prosti-
tute, as opposed to the solicitation by the prostitute. I am not 
confident that Colville meant to include "vices" among the activ-
ities alluded to in its statement that the tribe's interest in 
raising revenue is strongest "when the revenues are derived from 
value generated on the reservation by activities involving the 
Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal serv-
ices." 
Moreover, appn ts are correct that the CA9' s decision con-
flicts with/Penobscot. The Maine Sup Jud Ct did not, contrary to 
appees' reading, rely solely on unique federal law applicable to 
Maine. It said, "we conclude, first, that the [Indian] Nation's 
inherent sovereign powers would in any event not include the 
right to run a beano game in violation of state law, and second, 
that the federal and state acts have independently defined the 
sphere within which the tribe can operate free of state regula-
\ol\f\-~0 
tion, and that ~ cannot be considered an 'internal tribal 
matter' within that narrow sphere." 4 61 A • 2d , at 4 8 2 • This 
Court's DWSFQ could be explained as resting solely on the latter, 
narrower, ground; nonetheless, even if the CA9 was not bound 
under Hicks, the conflict seems real. 
In view of the recurring nature of the issue, the conflict 
with Penobscot, and the CA9's dubious application of Colville, a 
~
decent case can be made in favor of review. The pendancy of H.R. 
1920 may weaken the case in favor of review somewhat, although 
the excerpts from the congressional findings quoted by appees do 
not clearly indicate that tribal commercial gambling operations 
would in all circumstances be immune from state regulation. An 
additional factor that should perhaps weigh more heavily against 
review is that there may be an alternative ground to support the 
CA9's judgment: the CA9 never considered whether there must be a 
the part of the 
I 
grant by the federal government of the power on 
state to apply its laws on the reservation. This was the ap-
preach taken in Barona, where the CA9 found that Public Law 83-
~~ 280 did not authorize the application of California regulatory 
p.~ 
· p law to state bingo games; therefore, the CA9 reasoned, the state 
a~-2.-g 
o had no authority to apply its laws. See 694 F.2d, at 1187. If 
this reasoning is correct, then the same result should follow 
here, since the CA9 determined that Public Law 83-280 does not 
authorize application of California's gambling laws to on-
reservation activities. 
This last point suggests that the crucial question here may 
~
be whether the CA9 was correct in holding that Public Law 83-280 
does not authorize application of California's gambling laws. 
This Court denied cert in Barona, where the CA9 first reached 
that result, and I recommend following the same course here. As 
an appeal, however, the question pres,ented seems substantial 
enough to warrant a note. 
I recommend: Dismiss the appeal and deny __ cert: if the Con-
ference believes that an appeal is proper, I recommend NPJ. 
There is a response and an amicus brief. 
June 2, 1986 Gilles opn in petn 
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85-1708 California v. Cabazon and Morongo Bands of 
Indians(CA9) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
The question presented, as stated in 
Jurisdictional Statement, is: 
"Whether state and local laws prohibiting 
commercial gambling applied to Indian gambling 
operations, conducted on Indian reservations, 
that are patronized primarily by non-Indians"? 
the 
The facts are stipulated, and consist of only two 
-==----
paragraphs in CA9 's opinion. A-2. In brief, these two 
Tribes occupy separate reservations in Riverside County, 
California. Although the areas of the tribal lands are 
rather large, the Indian population in each is small. 
~ 
(the appellant's brief states that the Cabazon Tribe has 
"25 enrolled members and the Morongo Tribe has 730 
\\ 
members). The Tribes conduct bingo games for profit . 
... 
These games are the ~ole source of income for the Tribes, 
and also provide "the ~ain source of employment". Each of 
the Tribes has an ordinance regulating bingo games. The 
games are operated by vr:;on-Indian professional operators, 
,/" 
who receive a percentage of profits. The games are played 
"predominantly by non-Indian participants". Under 
California law, bingo games are unlawful except for bona 
fide charitable purposes, and even then the jackpots 
cannot exceed $250.00. Apparently there is no limit on 
the jackpots of the Tribes bingo games~ the state's brief 
indicates that often jackpots will be worth several 
thousand dollars. The Indians' brief responds that the 
------"'"7 
average prize is only $185.00 (P. 6). The Cabazon Tribe 
also conducts certain other gambling games such as poker. 
Although not included in the stipulated facts, 
appellees' brief states that some 80 to 100 tribes across 
the United States operate bingo games that in many of 
these states are unlawful. Br. P. 1. 
This suit was instituted by the Tribes, seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief. 
summary judgment, the V'DC ruled for --
On cross motions for 
v----
the Tribes and CA9 
affirmed in an unanimous opinion. The DC's opinion is of -----........, 
little help, and that of CA9 is generally superficial. 
Unhappily, apparently the SG has filed no amicus brief -
although numerous states and Indian Tribes have filed a 
number of such briefs. 
The parties rely on a number of this Court's Indian 
decisions, and in most instances disagree as to what the 
decisions hold. Apart from the fact that those of us 
educated in schools east of the Allegheny Mountains know 
little "Indian law", I may not have a chance to read the 
more important of these decisions (reread them) prior to 
argument. Therefore, I will particularly need in 
summary form my clerks identification of the most 
relevant cases and which way they "lean". I assume there 
is no clear controlling decision. 
I now summarize briefly and incompletely the 
arguments of the parties. As often happens, each brief -
when read separately - is rather persuasive. I note at 
the outset that we •:..:e_ostponed" as to jurisdiction. I 
-., 
think the jurisdictional issue is close. The California 
statute was not invalidated. It was held inapplicable as 
----. 
applied against these two Tribes. I think some of our 
cases would support appellate jurisdiction. I would not 
dissent, but would prefer to hear the cases here on 
certiorari. 
The State's Argument 
The state says that this case involves "federal 
common law principles governing state jurisdiction over 
Indian reservations", and "also involves two federal 
statutes: Public Law 280, and the Organized Crime Control 
Act (the Crime Act}. Since Congress has never determined 
the extent to which state laws apply on reservations, the 
state says that this Court has adopted "federal common law 
in determining their applicability." It is said that we 
have applied a "balancing" test in which we weigh state, 
federal and tribunal interest. In re Rice v. Rehner, 463 
U.S. 713, and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Reservation, 447 u.s. 134, are cited for the 
balancing test. 
Applying this test, the state emphasizes its "vital 
interest in prohibiting bingo games", and insists that 
state policy is frustrated if the Tribes are exempted from 
-· ·--------
state laws. Moreover, the state says that the "bingo 
games create a serious risk of organized criminal 
infiltration . because the games feature high-stakes 
and are not regulated." In addition, the Tribes lack the 
law enforcement capability to ensure that the games are 
honestly run. This is a problem of considerable state 
interest because the patrons of the bingo games 
overwhelmingly are California non-Indians. 
With respect to the federal interest, the state says 
that at most "this is neutral in this case". Congress has 
not authorized the Tribes to conduct gambling operations 
in violation of state law. Indeed, no federal agency or 
official regulates or supervises the Indian games. The 
state's two briefs pay little attention to the asserted 
Indian interests, but conclude that the "common law 




the state relies on 
above. (! iri-O it is 
the two federal 
said that Public -
Law 280, that "authorizes California and certain other 
states to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian reservations, authorizes California to apply its 
gambling laws on Indian reservations". Bryan v. Itasca 
County, 426 U.S. 373, is cited, in addition to Rice v. 
Rehner. 
With respect to 
~~ 
the Federa1:·--.C~Jme Act, the state 
-( 
flatly says that it authorizes "state and local gambling 
laws to be applied on federal lands, including Indian 
reservations." Thus, it is contended that rather than 
preempting state laws, Congress "has affirmatively 
authorized their application." 
The Tribes' Argument 
The Tribes' basic position is that "absent expressed 
Congressional authorization, states have no jurisdiction 
over Indian tribes on their reservations." Thus, because 
the California bingo laws directly restrict the Tribes, 
and no federal statute gives California this authority, 
the cases upon which the state relies are inapplicable. 
Nor does the federal common law "balancing test" apply, as 
this test has been applied "by this Court to review state 
assertions of jurisdiction over non-Indians on the 
reservations". But even assuming that this test may be 
applied, the scales weight heavily in favor of the Tribes. 
In brief summary, as noted above, the Tribes have no 
other source of income and, realistically, no other means 
of providing employment for members. Moreover, strong 
federal policy favors encouraging Indian tribes to become - -- _____., ----......... 
economically self-sufficient as this would minimize the 
substantial federal aid that so frequently is necessary. 
But apart from the "balancing test", the Tribes' 
brief insists that neither of the federal statutes relied 
upon by the state is relevant. They state categorically 
that PL 280 "does not confer upon the states any 
jurisdiction over the governmental activities of the 
Tribes." Citing Bryan, 426 u.s. at 389, the Tribes state 
that "there is notably absent any conferral of state 
jurisdiction over the Tribes themselves". More recently, 
their brief cites Three Affiliated Tribes, 90 Lawyers Ed. 
2d 881, as stating that "we have never read PL 280 to 
constitute a waiver of Tribunal sovereign immunity , nor 
found PL 280 to represent an abandonment of the federal 
interest in guarding Indian self-governence". ~at 894. 
See P. 33 et seq of appellees brief for a more 
expansive statement of why PL280 is thought not to be 
applicable. 
Similarly, the Federal Crime Act also is viewed as 
irrelevant. It is argued flatly that "nothing in the OCCA 
or its legislative history states or suggests a federal 
policy to curtail the Tribunal activities at issue in this 
case. Indeed, the legislative history of that Act, does 
not mention Indian Tribes at all." The brief also states 
that the Crime Act's exemption of bingo games "applies 
whether or not a game conducted by a tax exempt 
organization otherwise violates state or local law .... " 
See Br. p. 43 et seq. 
I have not studied either of these two federal 
statues, and want the views of my clerk. From what I have 
read in the briefs of the parties and in the opinion of 
CA9, I am inclined to think that neither of these federal 
statutes is controlling in this case. My tentative view, 
o. 
therefore, is that we fall back on the "balancing" type of 
analysis mentioned above. 
--- ·-- - - ·---~ 
It is interesting that neither of the briefs 
addresses specifically the extent to which or whether 
organized crime has infiltrated Indian tribal bingo game 
operations. My guess is that at least with respect to 
·-,.... 
such as these, organized crime "could not --
care less". 
Weighing rather heavily with me is what appears to be 
The Appendix 
Director of 
Indian Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of 
the Interior. His affidavit states categorically that it 
is "the Department's position that Tribal bingo 
enterprises are an appropriate means by which Tribes can 
further their economic self-sufficiency ..•. " Indeed, the 
affidavit states that economic development and Tribal 
self-determination are "federal goals for the Tribes". It 
also is interesting that this affidavit notes that a 
"number of tribes have turned to bingo enterprises to 
supply revenue just as many states have instituted state-
run lotteries for the same purposes." This is a rather 
persuasive point. 
In addition, see P. 243 of the Joint Appendix for a 
memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of the 
~ 
Interior Department that at least inferentially supports 
the Tribes. I lean toward agreeing with the Tribes, 
although I am not at rest. 
LFP, JR. 
- - -
"koiz;_ ~Zs- ~ 9-{f 
ff s _, 1 () x- CeJt..i'.jt "' . ~  ~"t.d-~ (c# 
~/-A-f ~~-
;.17u_ c~. ~~ ~ .s~Q..-Loz:.tL-1~ 
~~1 ~7!1 '1 4~~ ~~ ~ 
~~~~~ 
~fO f~ &rZ<--9~ ·~~~~~ 
~L~ -4 ~~~eU.VJ 
C')4 '1, ~ ,;._., ~~~C#K~ 
~.~J~a-~~ 
~~~';i5~ tJ~~v.~~~ 
4</-? L-t.>. t"3-c.l-., "-~ "· ~ ~::Jk.r'. 7tS .. 
CA-? ~ T~ 4L~ ~~~tLJ s--1--&:tz:s 
/0 j. J ~ ' I I . () .-' ~ s ~ 
-:2 . '-7 . u/-€_ ~
~~ ~ . c/-l? ~-aa •. ~~ 
~s-~~~~~~-
f) d.() ~~ J-t_A.o~ LeA(_ ~  
~~· ~ ~1-~c;._,...l- a+<.~~~ 
/ · · - ~ / -
3.~~~~ -
/}r>~~~~'P.L.~Z¥0 ~ 
~~'1~~~ ~1--t::h ~~(ttj2s) 
y ~ ~~-~~LLu-~~. 
~ ~} Le~~ ~  c:::.~. 
~- 2f/j&d~~~ ~f-£_._~ ~T~ 
~"'--~ <.~' H..--<..'f~~~ 
~6-/~~~f-~~ 
~~~~ 
.5'"": cfl"'"~· a-/~~~ ~. 5~ ~-~-
1~~~~~~,~~-~5tc~. 
s-e.L-.~1 ~ ~ d-t...,c;::;_.., ~t-. s~~~ 
. 
'· 
- y . 
~/-4-f ~~-
/. 1Zu_ c~ . ~Art.c_~ ~ .s~q...Luz;tt-1~ 
~~1~3~9~~~~ 
~~~~+t:J 
~fO f~ VZ<-.-9~ ~~~~~ 




4<f. 7 u.>. ,~ v- "-~ "· ~ ~::J k.~. 11s 
~ - J •. 
cA-1 ~ r~ ~~ ou-1-~ tLJ s-1-&P:i;:s 
-z. Q __ ---- t9 . U)..L~~ _, ~ s ~ 
~i£2~ . c4?--d~--~ 
~s-~~~~~-~­
f)~~~~~~~ 
~~· ~ ~~--~~1- a.L<~~~ / - _______....-- ;' -
3.~~~~. 
/}t:>~~~~f>.L.d.A-U"Z90 ~ 
~~1~·~~ ~t-.a,_ ~~(lt/-z.s) 
57 .d2..D ~~-~ ~~ ~ ~. 
~ ~ } t:.~~J..Iu:z-d ~  G~ 
~- Jf~af~~~ ~~-~~ U-1.--T~ 
~ /2-~ ~::..U: /7-J._ 'f~~ 4 
6-/~q..~f-~~ 
~~~~ 
_j--: 4D~~ . &I~~~ ~ . .:s~ ~-~-
1 ~~I!J1J~~~ ~f.~5tc~. 
s~ ~ ~ 0-- d-t_,c;::;_, ~t-. .s t!!f..et.L£J.J 
c-f, 9-t.v~ ~ ~~~h-/~ 
. . 
-. 





To: Justice Powell November 29, 1986 
From: Bob 
No. 85-1708, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, et 
al. 
Appeal from CA9 (Anderson, Farris, Nelson) 
Tuesday, December 9, 1986 (4th case} 
Question Presented 
Do state and local laws prohibiting commercial gambling 
apply to Indian gambling operations conducted on Indian 




The Morongo Band of Mission Indians has 730 enrolled 
members and a reservation of 32,300 acres. The Cabazon Band has 
only 25 enrolled members and a reservation of 1,700 acres. Both 
bands have adopted tribal ordinances authorizing and regulating 
bingo games on their reservations. 
approved th~orongo ordinance, 
The ecretary~~ ~ 
and also approved a management 
agreement between the Morongo Band and an outside management 
firm. The Cabazon Band operates both a bingo parlor and a "card 
6:) 
room" where patrons play variations on draw poker. The Cabazon 
ordinance apparently was approved by the Secretary in September, 
1986. Red brf. app. B-3. The Cabazon Band has terminated its 
outside management agreement and now operates the bingo parlor 
and card room itself. Both bands have built large halls to 
accommodate their gambling patrons. The Morongo hall holds 1,400 
players; the Cabazon hall holds 500. Most of the patrons are 
non-Indians. The Cabazon gambling operation provides employment 
for all enrolled members and their families on request. The 
Morongo operation employs 101 Indians. Proceeds from the 
gambling operations are used to promote the health, education, 
and welfare of band members. 
California has banned all lotteries other than those 
specifically authorized by law. Cal. Penal Code §320. 
California specifically authorizes bingo games conducted by 
charitable organizations, if, among other requirements, the game 
is conducted by members of the organization, the profits are kept 
in a separate fund, and jackpots do not exceed $250. Id. §326.5 
The parties dispute how closely the Inidan games conform to the 
statutory requirements. Although the Indian jackpots may average 
less than $250, some of their jackpots apparently are worth 
thousands of dollars. The Cabazon card games do not violate 
state law, but are banned by Riverside County Ordinance No. 331. 
TheV DC granted summary judgment in favor of the Indians 
and enjoined the State and County from applying their gambling 
laws on the reservations. ~A9 affirmed. CA9 balanced the state 
interest in controlling organized crime against the federal and 
tribal interests in fostering the Indians' economic development 
and self-government, and concluded that, as a matter of federal ----common law, the state and local gambling laws do not apply on the 
reservations. 
II. DISCUSSION ~ ~ <:J.-~ ta.,_,/--
1. Jurisdiction.~ State, contending that its gambling 
laws were held invalid "as applied" to the Indian reservations, 
has invoked the Court's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§1254 (2). Appellate jurisdiction lies if the CA holds a state 
statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 76 n. 6 (1970}. Section 1254(2) 
does not extend to cases "where an exercise of authority under 
state law is invalidated without reference to the state statute"; 
"a state statute [must be] expressly struck down on 
constitutional grounds." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 u.s. 
238, 247 (1984}. The question in Silkwood was whether an award 
of punitive damages authorized by state law is preempted by the 
~· 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The Court noted that the lower court 
did not mention the state statute, and the statute was left 
untouched by the court's judgment. In this case, CA9 did discuss 
California's gambling statutes, but the state statutes were left 
------ - --- ----- -"untouched," in that they still apply except on Indian 
reservations. I am inclined to recommend dismissing the appeal~~ 
and granting certiorari, on the basis of the general principle 
that statutes authorizing appeals are strictly construed. Perry 
Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 43 
(1983}. The question is a close one, though. The Court has 
heard appeals from state court decisions holding that state laws 
are applicable to Indian reservations. E.g., McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973}. The State argues, 
with some force, that the rules for §1257 and §1254(2} should be 
the same. If the Court holds that there is no appellate 
jurisdiction under § 1254 ( 2) , it may be necessary to reexamine 
§1257 in a later case. 
2. The Merits. The Court long ago abandoned the view 
that state laws have no force on Indian reservations, see 
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 560 (1832}. Today, "even on 
reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application 
would interfere with reservation self-government or would impair 
a right granted or reserved by federal law." Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones, 411 u.s. 145, 148 (1973). The Court's recent --
decisions in this field have shifted the focus "away from the C.~ 
idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state 
jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption." 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 u.s. 164, 172 (1973). 
The Court does not apply the "standards of preemption that have 
emerged in other areas of the law." White Mountain Apache Tribe 
v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). The preemption analysis is 
"informed by historical notions of tribal sovereignty" but not 
"determined by them." Rice v. Rehner, 463 u.s. 713, 718 (1983). 
The "traditions of tribal independence," in turn, "reflect 'the 
accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal 
Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the 
other.'" Id., at 719, quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 u.s. 134, 156 (1980). 
"[B) road preemption of state laws in Indian country has been 
consistently recognized as a necessary implication from the 
federal policy protecting tribal sovereignty." F. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 278 (1982 ed.). 
There is some evidence of a tribal "tradition" of 
commercial gambling. One expert, Professor Wallace, testified 
that Indians did not "traditionally" engage in commercial 
gambling with non-Indians. · J.A. 152-172. Dr. Bean, however, 
studied a more recent historical period and concluded that 
Cahuilla Indians, including the Cabazon and Morongo Bands, have 
earned money by providing gambling activities for non-Indians 
since the end of the 18th century. J.A. 206-215. This type of 
historical inquiry was appropriate in Rice v. Rehner, because 
there is no doubt that Congress long ago divested the tribes of 
power to regulate liquor transactions. Because the gambling 
"tradition" is not so clean-cut, the historical inquiry does not 
seem particularly useful. 
a. Federal and Tribal Interests. The bingo operations 
further the federal and tribal interest in promoting economic 
development on the Indian reservations and, indirectly, promote 




sound reservation economies, the concept of self-government 
little meaning." 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 98, 99 (Jan. 24, 
1983). The ~artment of the Interior has provided considerable 
support for tribal bingo operations. An Assistant Secretary of 
the Interior has issued a policy directive that tribal bingo 
"should be protected and enhanced. " J.A. 243-244. The 
Department has approved tribal bingo ordinances and issued 
guidelines for management contracts with outside managers. The 
Secretary has guaranteed about $8 million in loans used to 
construct gambling facilities on Indian reservations. It is 
unlikely that the Secretary would have "established, financed and 
participated in" gambling activities if it took the view that the 
states were "free to nullify the entire arrangement." New Mexico 
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 u.s., 324, 340 (1983) • In 
b 1985 ;;?I t : Novem er, , an n er 10r Department witness told the House 
Interior Committee that the Department would oppose "state 
control over bingo because it would drive Indian bingo out of 
business," and stated that the organized crime risks are 
"manageable and do not warrant state regulation." Testimony of 
Marian Blank Horn, Principal Deputy Solicitor, Dept. of the 
Interior (Nov. 14, 1985). A Justice Department spokeswoman 
• 
7. 
recently testified before the Senate Select Committee on Indian 
Affairs in favor of legislation that would place tribal bingo 
activities under federal and tribal jurisdiction. Statement of 
Victoria Toensing, Deputy Ass't AG (June 17, 1986). 
Congress has expressed considerable support for Indian 
bingo, although it has not passed any legislation. The House 
~passed H.R. 1920, the Indian Gambling Regulatory Act, and the 
7 Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs recommended Senate 
/ 
passage. s. Rep. No. 99-493. The 99th Congress adjourned before 
the Senate voted on the bill. 
b. State Interests. I am not persuaded by California's .._ ........__ __ _ 
argument that tribal bingo frustrates general state policies 
~ ------------------------------------gambling,~ against gambling. California permits various forms of 
includi~acing, a state lottery, and the very card games ~.' 
played in the Cabazon card room. 
fDI~ 
California also permi~ ;1.~ 
charitable organizations to conduct bingo games under conditio~ ~ 
similar to those imposed by the tribal ordinances. California'~ C~ 
bingo law is aimed at the operators of bingo games~ hence non- Cf~ 
Indians who play bingo on the reservations are not violating any ~~ 
State law. 
6J..t...-
Finally, the off-reservation effects of gambling~ 
unlike those of liquor or fireworks, are minimal. T~ 
The State also argues that it has an interst in preventing ~ 
..., -
the infiltration of organized crime. There is no evidence that 
organized crime is likely to infiltrate Indian bingo games. The 
House Committee considering H.R. 1920 found no indication that 
organized crime is involved in any Indian bingo enterprise. H. 
Rep. No. 99-448, at 10. The Department of the Interior has 
7. 
estified before the Senate Select Committee on Indian 
favor of legislation that would place tribal bingo 
under federal and tribal jurisdiction. Statement of 
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issued guidelines for outside management contracts. The 
guidelines require an FBI background check on all non-Indian 
management personnel. 
c. Particular Statutes. California argues that the 
Congress, by enacting ~c ~ La~~ and ( he Organized . Crirn~ 
Control Act, has expressly provided that California's gambling 
laws apply on Indian reservations. I have concluded that neither ~~ 
statute controls the outcome in this case. ~1-
a. Public Law 280. PL-280, originally enacted in~ 
1953, provides that "the criminal laws of [California] shall have 
the same force and effect within Indian country as they have 
elsewhere within the State •... " 18 u.s.c. §1162. The statute 
also provides that "civil laws of [California] that are of 
general application to private persons or private property shall 
have the same force and effect within Indian country as they 
have elsewhere within the State " 28 u.s.c. §1360. The 
primary purpose of PL-280 was to combat lawlessness on the Indian 
reservations. See S. Rep. No. 699, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 
(1953). The statute exempted several reservations solely because 
their legal systems were "functioning in a reasonably 
satisfactory manner." Id. , at 6. A leading commentator 
concludes that civil jurisdiction was conferred on the state 
courts "as an afterthought . . . added because it comported with 
the pro-assimilationist drift of federal policy, and because it 
was convenient and cheap." Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits 
of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 535, 543-544 (1975). 
The parties argue at length over the validity of a 
distinction between "civil/regulatory" laws and 
"criminal/prohibitory" laws. The distinction grows out of a 
dictum in Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, that Congress, in 
enacting PL-280, did not intend to confer on the states "general 
civil regulatory powers, including taxation." 426 u.s. 373, 390 
(1976). The Tribes argue, and CA9 held, that such a distinction 
makes sense, and that California's bingo statutes are 
"civil/regulatory" in nature, and so outside the jurisdictional 
grant of PL-280. The distinction seems hopelessly indeterminate 
to me, and I would avoid relying upon it. The Tribes argue that 
the bingo statutes are regulatory because they do not outlaw 
bingo entirely, but 
restrictions. This 
merely set out time, place, and manner 
does not solve the indeterminacy problem, 
because whether an activity is "completely" prohibited depends on 
the definition of the activity. For example, one might say that 
the activity of stud poker is completely prohibited in 
California, or one might say that poker is "regulated" by laws 
prohibiting stud poker but permitting some forms of draw poker. 
The Tribes point out that federal courts undertake a similar 
analysis when they determine whether a state law is "crimina!" 
within the meaning of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §13, 
but the "civil/criminal" distinction is much sharper. 
I think PL-280 can be handled more simply. The Court has 
"never read PL-280 to constitute a waiver of tribal sovereign 
immunity, nor found PL-280 to represent an abndonment of the 
federal interest in guarding Indian self-governance." Three 
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold v. Wold Engineering, 106 S. 
Ct. 2305, 2314 (1986}. In construing the statute, the Court has 
noted "there is notably absent any conferral of state 
jurisdiction over the tribes themselves " Bryan, 426 u.s., 
at 388. Because, as the "balancing analysis" demonstrates, 
enforcement of state gambling laws would be inconsistent with the 
federal interest in promoting self-governance through tribal 
economic development, PL-280 does not apply. 
(The Tribes argue that the "balancing" analysis should not 
apply because PL-280 determines the full extent of California's 
jurisdiction over them. This approach seems inconsistent with 
the Court's prior decisions, and might lead to the anomalous 
result that Pl-280 states have less jurisdiction over Indian 
country than non-PL-280 states.} 
b. ve;:ganized Crime Control Act. The OCCA prohibits 
gambling activities "in violation of the law of a State or 
--- ·------
political subdivision in which it is conducted." 18 u.s.c. ---------
§1955. The State contends that the plain language of this 
statute indicates a Congressional intent that state and local 
gambling laws should apply on Indian reservations. Because there ~ 
is no reference to Indian reservations in the legislative 
~ 
~-----
history, it seems unlikely that Congress 
question. OCCA does, however, exempt "any 
considered th~ 
bingo game .• ~~ 
conducted by an organization exempt from tax under 26 u.s.c. ~ 
§501 (c) (3} if no part of the gross receipts . . . inures to the 
benefit of any •.. member except as compensation for actual 
expenses incurred by him in the conduct of such activity." 18 
u.s.c. §1955 Ce). The tribal bingo games seem closer to "non-
profit" games than to regular commercial gambling operations. 
The federal government has never attempted to enforce OCCA 
agait~ st a tribal bingo enterprise. 
1 CA9 relied on its holding that the Indian gambling 
I 
operations are essentially similar to charitable bingo games 
permitted by California law, and so are not contrary to 
California's gambling policy. I see no reason to rely on this 
holding, and would instead simply hold that Congress has not 
expressed an intent to apply the OCCA to Indian reservations. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Bingo operations are a major source of revenue and 
employment for the Indians. The Tribes' raising of revenue 
through bingo and cards does not seem much different from 
California's raising of revenue through a lottery. There is no 
convincing evidence that organized crime is likely to infiltrate 
the Indian gambling operations. 
I recommend that you vote to AFFIRM the judgment of CA9. ~~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1708 
CALIFORNIA, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. CABAZON 
BAND OF MISSION INDIANS ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians, fed-
erally recognized Indian tribes, occupy reservations in River-
side County, California. 1 Each Band, pursuant to an ordi-
nance approved by the Secretary of the Interior, conducts 
bingo games on its reservation. 2 The Cabazon Band has also 
1 The Cabazon Reservation was originally set apart for the "permanent 
use and occupancy" of the Cabazon Indians by Executive Order of May 15, 
1876. The Morongo Reservation also was first established by executive 
order. In 1891, in the Mission Indian Relief Act, 26 Stat. 712, Congress 
declared reservations "for the sole use and benefit" of the Cabazon and 
Morongo Bands. The United States holds the land in trust for the Tribes. 
The governing bodies of both Tribes have been recognized by the Secre-
tary of the Interior. 
z The Cabazon ordinance authorizes the Band to sponsor bingo games 
within the reservation "[i]n order to promote economic development of the 
Cabazon Indian Reservation and to generate tribal revenues" and provides 
that net revenues from the games shall be kept in a separate fund to be 
used "for the purpose of promoting the health, education, welfare and well 
being of the Cabazon Indian Reservation and for other tribal purposes." 
App. to Brief for Appellees lb-3b. The ordinance further provides that no 
one other than the Band is authorized to sponsor a bingo game within the 
reservation, and that the games shall be open to the public, except that no 
one under 18 years old may play. The Morongo ordinance similarly au-
thorizes the establishment of a tribal bingo enterprise and dedicates reve-
nues to programs to promote the health, education, and general welfare of 
tribal members. App. to Brief for Appellees 1a-6a. It additionally pro-
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opened a card club at which draw poker and other card games 
are played. The games are open to the public and are played 
predominantly by non-Indians coming onto the reservations. 
The games are a major source of employment for tribal mem-
bers, and the profits are the Tribes' sole source of income. 
The State of California seeks to apply to the two Tribes Cal. 
Pen. Code §326.5 (West 1987 Supp.). That statute does not 
entirely prohibit the playing of bingo but permits it when the 
games are operated and staffed by members of designated 
charitable organizations who may not be paid for their serv-
ices. Profits must be kept in special accounts and used only 
for charitable purposes; prizes may not exceed $250 per 
game. Asserting that the bingo games on the two reserva-
tions violated each of these restrictions, California insisted 
that the tribes comply with state law. a Riverside County 
also sought to apply its local Ordinance No. 558 regulating 
bingo, as well as its Ordinance No. 331, prohibiting the play-
ing of draw poker and the other card games. 
The Tribes sued the County in federal district court seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that the County had no authority 
vides that the games may be conducted at any time but must be conducted 
at least three days per week, that there shall be no prize limit for any sin-
gle game or session, that no person under 18 years old shall be allowed to 
play, and that all employees shall wear identification. 
3 The Tribes admit that their games violate the provision governing 
staffing and the provision setting a limit on jackpots. They dispute the 
State's assertion that they do not maintain separate funds for the bingo op-
erations. At oral argument, counsel for the State asserted, contrary to 
the position taken in the merits brief and contrary to the stipulated facts in 
this case, App. 65, , 24, 82-83, 1115, that the Tribes are among the chari-
table organizations authorized to sponsor bingo games under the statute. 
It is therefore unclear whether the State intends to put the tribal bingo 
enterprises out of business or only to impose on them the staffing, jackpot 
limit and separate fund requirements. The tribal bingo enterprises are 
apparently consistent with other provisions of the statute: minors are not 
allowed to participate, the games are conducted in buildings owned by the 
Tribes on tribal property, the games are open to the public, and persons 
must be physically present to participate. 
85-1708--0PINION 
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to apply its ordinances inside the reservations and an injunc-
tion against their enforcement. The State intervened, the 
facts were stipulated and the District Court granted the 
Tribes' motion for summary judgment, holding that neither 
the State nor the County had any authority to enforce its 
gambling laws within the reservations. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 783 F. 2d 900 (1986), the 
State and the County appealed, and we postponed jurisdic-
tion to the merits. -- U. S. --.4 
I 
The Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes I 
retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members 
and their territory," United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 
544, 557 (1975), and that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, 
and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the 
States," Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 154 (1980). It is clear, 
however, that state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on 
their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided. 
Here, the State insists that Congress has twice given its ex-
press consent: first in Pub. L. 280 in 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 18 
U. S. C. § 1162, 28 U. S. C.§ 1360, and second in the Orga-
nized Crime Control Act in 1970, 84 Stat. 937, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1955. We disagree in both respects. 
In Pub. L. 280, Congress expressly granted six States, in-
cluding California, jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian 
'The Court of Appeals "affinn[ed] the summary judgment and the per-
manent injunction restraining the County and the State from applying 
their gambling laws on the reservations." 783 F . 2d 900, 906. The judg-
ment of the District Court declared that the State statute and County ordi-
nance were of no force and effect within the two reservations, that the 
......- State and the County were without jurisdiction to enforce them, and that 
they were therefore enjoined from doing so. Since it is now sufficiently 
clear that the State and County laws at issue were held, as applied to the 
gambling activities on the two reservations, to be "invalid as repugnant to 
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States" within the meaning 
of 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2), the case is within our appellate jurisdiction. 
85-1708-0PINION 
4 CALIFORNIA v. CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS 
country 5 within the States and provided for the assumption 
of jurisdiction by other states. In § 2, California was 
granted broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed 
by or against Indians within all Indian country within the 
State. 6 Section 4's grant of civil jurisdiction was more lim-
ited. 7 In Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373 (1976), we 
interpreted § 4 to grant states jurisdiction over private civil 
litigation involving reservation Indians in state court, but not 
to grant general civil regulatory authority. !d., at 385, 
388-390. We held, therefore, that Minnesota could not 
apply its personal property tax within the reservation. Con-
gress' primary concern in enacting Pub. L. 280 was combat-
ting lawlessness on reservations. I d., at 379-380. The act 
plainly was not intended to effect total assimilation of Indian 
tribes into mainstream American society. I d., at 387. We 
'"Indian country," as defined at 18 U. S. C. § 1151, includes "all land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, 
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation." This defi-
nition applies to questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction. 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S. 425, 427, n. 2 (1975). The 
Cabazon and Morongo Reservations are thus Indian country. 
'Section 2(a), codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1162(a), provides: 
"Each of the States .. . listed in the following table shall have jurisdic-
tion over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian 
country listed . . . to the same extent that such State . .. has jurisdiction 
over offenses committed elsewhere within the State ... , and the criminal 
laws of such State ... shall have the same force and effect within such In-
dian country as they have elsewhere within the State . . . : 
California .. ... All Indian country within the State." 
7 Section 4(a), codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1360(a) provides: 
"Each of the States ... listed in the following table shall have jurisdic-
tion over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are par-
ties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed . . . to the same extent 
that such State . .. has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and 
those civil laws of such State . .. that are of general application to private 
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within 
such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State .. . : 
California .. .. . All Indian country within the State." 
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recognized that a grant to states of general civil regulatory 
power over Indian reservations would result in the destruc-
tion of tribal institutions and values. Accordingly, when a 
state seeks to enforce a law within an Indian reservation 
under the authority of Pub. L. 280, it must be determined 
whether the law is criminal in nature, and thus fully appli-
cable to the reservation under § 2, or civil in nature, and ap-
plicable only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation in 
state court. 
The Minnesota personal property tax at issue in Bryan was 
unquestionably civil in nature. The California bingo statute 
is not so easily categorized. California law permits bingo 
games to be conducted only by charitable and other specified 
organizations, and then only by their members who may not 
receive any wage or profit for doing so; prizes are limited and 
receipts are to be segregated and used only for charitable 
purposes. Violation of any of these provisions is a misde-
meanor. California insists that these are criminal laws 
which Pub. L. 280 permits it to enforce on the reservations. 
Following its earlier decision in Barona Group of the 
Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F. 
2d 1185 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 929 (1983), which also 
involved the applicability of § 326.5 of the California Penal 
Code to Indian reservations, the Court of Appeals rejected 
this submission. 783 F. 2d, at 901-903. In Barona, apply-
ing what it thought to be the civil/criminal dichotomy drawn 
in Bryan v. Itasca County, the Court of Appeals drew a dis-
tinction between state "criminal/prohibitory'' laws and state 
"civil/regulatory'' laws: if the intent of a state law is generally 
to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280's grant 
of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits 
the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classi-
fied as civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its 
enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is 
whether the conduct at issue violates the state's public pol-
icy. Inquiring into the nature of § 326.5, the Court of Ap-
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peals held that it was regulatory rather than prohibitory. 8 
This was the analysis employed, with similar results, by the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F. 2d 310 (1981), cert. denied, 
455 U. S. 1020 (1982), which the Ninth Circuit found 
persuasive. 9 
We are persuaded that the prohibitory/regulatory distinc-
tion is consistent with Bryan's construction of Pub. L. 280. 
It is not a bright-line rule, however; and as the Ninth Circuit 
itself observed, an argument of some weight may be made 
);hat the bingo statute is prohibitory rather than regulatory. 
B~t in the present case, the court reexamined the state law 
d reaffirmed its holding in Barona, and we are reluctant to 
Oisagree with that court's view of the nature and intent of the 
state law at issue here. 
There is surely a fair basis for its conclusion. California 
does not prohibit all forms of gambling. California itself op-
8 The Court of Appeals questioned whether we indicated disapproval of 
the prohibitory/regulatory distinction in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713 
(1983). We did not. We rejected in that case an asserted distinction be-
tween state "substantive" law and state "regulatory'' law in the context of 
18 U. S. C. § 1161, which provides that certain federal statutory provisions 
prohibiting the sale and possession of liquor within Indian country do not 
apply ''provided such act or transaction is in confonnity both with the laws 
of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance 
duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian coun-
try . . .. " We noted that nothing in the text or legislative history of 
§ 1161 supported the asserted distinction, and then contrasted that statute 
with Pub. L. 280. "In the absence of a context that might possibly require 
it, we are reluctant to make such a distinction. Cf. Bryan v. Itasca 
County, 426 U. S. 373, 390 (1976) (grant of civil jurisdiction in 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1360 does not include regulatory jurisdiction to tax in light of tradition of 
immunity from taxation)." 463 U. S., at 734, n. 18. 
• Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F. 2d 310 (1981), cert. denied, 455 
U. S. 1020 (1982), was an action by the Seminole Tribe for a declaratory 
judgment that the Florida bingo statute did not apply to its operation of a 
bingo hall on its reservation. See also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. 
McG'Uigan, 626 F. Supp. 245 (D. Conn. 1986); Oneida Tribe of Indians v. 
Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981). 
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erates a state lottery, Cal. Govt. Code § 8880 et seq. (West 
1987 Supp.), and daily encourages its citizens to participate in 
this state-run gambling. California also permits parimutuel 
horse-race betting. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 19400-19667 
(West 1964 and 1987 Supp. ). Although certain enumerated 
gambling games are prohibited under Cal. Pen. Code § 330 
(West 1987 Supp.), games not enumerated, including the card 
games played in the Cabazon card club, are permissible. 
The Tribes assert that more than 400 card rooms similar to 
the Cabazon card club flourish in California, and the State 
does not dispute this fact. Brief for Appellees 47-48. Also, 
as the Court of Appeals· noted, bingo is legally sponsored by 
many different organizations and is widely played in Califor-
nia. There is no effort to forbid the playing of bingo by any 
member of the public over the age of 18. Indeed, the per-
mitted bingo games must be open to the general public. Nor 
is there any limit on the number of games which eligible orga-
nizations may operate, the receipts which they may obtain 
from the games, the number of games which a participant 
may play, or the amount of money which a participant may 
spend, either per game or in total. In light of the fact that 
California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, 
including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its 
state lottery, we must conclude that California regulates 
rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in 
particular. 
Caig"ornia ar~s, however, that high stakes, unregulated 
bingo, the conduct which attracts organized crime, is a mis-
demeanor in California and may be prohibited on Indian res-
ervations. But that an otherwise regulatory law is enforce-
able by criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily 
convert it into a criminal law within the meaning of Pub. L. 
280. Otherwise, the distinction between § 2 and § 4 of that 
law could easily be avoided and total assimilation permitted. 
This view, adopted here and by the Fifth Circuit in the 
Butterworth case, we find persuasive. Accordingly, we con-
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elude that Pub. L. 280 does not authorize California to en-
force Cal. Pen. Code § 326.5 within the Cabazon and Morongo 
Reservations. 10 
California and Riverside County also argue that the Orga-
nized Crime Control Act (OCCA) authorizes the application 
of their gambling laws to the tribal bingo enterprises. The 
OCCA makes certain violations of state and local gambling 
laws violations of federal law. 11 The Court of Appeals re-
jected appellants' argument, relying on its earlier decisions in 
United States v. Farris, 624 F. 2d 890 (CA9 1980), cert. de-
10 Nor does Pub. L. 280 authorize the County to apply its gambling ordi-
nances to the reservations. We note initially that it is doubtful that Pub. 
L. 280 authorizes the application of any local laws to Indian reservations. 
Section 2 of Pub. L. 280 provides that the criminal laws of the "State" shall 
have the same force and effect within Indian country as they have else-
where. This language seems clearly to exclude local laws. We need not 
decide this issue, however, because even if Pub. L. 280 does make local 
criminal/prohibitory laws applicable on Indian reservations, the ordinances 
in question here do not apply. Consistent with our analysis of Cal. Pen. 
Code § 326.5 above, we conclude that Ordinance No. 558, the bingo ordi-
nance, is regulatory in nature. Although Ordinance No. 331 prohibits 
gambling on all card games, including the games played in the Cabazon 
card club, the County does not prohibit municipalities within the County 
from enacting municipal ordinances permitting these card games, and two 
municipalities have in fact done so. It is clear, therefore, that Ordinance 
No. 331 does not prohibit these card games for purposes of Pub. L. 280. 
11 The Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1955, provides in per-
tinent part: 
"(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns 
all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more that 
$20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
(b) As used in this section-
(!) ''illegal gambling business means a gambling business which -
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it 
is conducted; 
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, super-
vise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and 
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a 
period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of$2,000 in any single 
day." (Emphasis added.) 
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nied, 449 U. S. 1111 (1981), and Barona Group ofthe Capitan 
Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, supra. 783 F. 
2d, at 903. The court explained that whether a tribal activ-
ity is "a violation of the law of a state" within the meaning of 
the OCCA depends on whether it violates the "public policy" 
of the state, the same test for application of state law under 
Pub. L. 280, and similarly concluded that bingo is not con-
trary to the public policy of California. 12 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has rejected this 
view. United States v. Dakota, 796 F. 2d 186 (CA6 1986). 13 
Since the OCCA standard is simply whether the gambling 
business is being operated in "violation of the law of a state," 
there is no basis for the regulatory/prohibitory distinction 
that it agreed is suitable in construing and applying Pub. L. 
280. 796 F. 2d, at 188. And because enforcement of OCCA 
is an exercise of federal rather than state authority, there is 
no danger of state encroachment on Indian tribal sover-
eignty. I d. This latter observation exposes the ftaw in ap-
pellants' reliance on OCCA. That enactment is indeed a fed-
eral law that, among other things, defines certain federal 
crimes over which the district courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 14 There is nothing in OCCA indicating that the states 
are to have any part in enforcing federal crimes or are au-
thorized to make arrests on Indian reservations that in the 
1J In Farris, in contrast, the court had concluded that a gambling busi-
ness, featuring blackjack, poker and dice, operated by tribal members on 
the Puyallup Reservation violated the public policy of Washington; the 
United States, therefore, could enforce OCCA against the Indians. 
11 In Dakota, the United States sought a declaratory judgment that a 
gambling business, also featuring the playing of blackjack, poker, and dice, 
operated by two members of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community on 
land controlled by the Community, and under a license issued by the Com-
munity, violated OCCA. The Court of Appeals held that the gambling 
business violated Michigan law and OCCA. 
14 Title 18 U.S. C. §3231 provides: "The district courts of the United 
States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, 
of all offenses against the laws of the United States." 
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absence of OCCA they could not effect. We are not in-
fonned of any federal efforts to employ OCCA to prosecute 
the playing of bingo on Indian reservations, although there 
are more than 100 such enterprises currently in operation, 
many of which have been in existence for several years, for 
the most part with the encouragement of the Federal Gov-
ernment. 15 Whether or not, then, the Sixth Circuit is right 
and the Ninth Circuit wrong about the coverage of OCCA, a 
matter that we do not decide, there is no warrant for Califor-
nia to make arrests on reservations and thus, through 
OCCA, enforce its gambling laws against Indian tribes. 
II 
Because the State and County laws at issue here are im- ~ 
posed directly on the Tribes that operate the games, and are 
not expressly pennitted by Congress, the Tribes argue that 
the judgment below should be affinned without more. They 
rely on the statement in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission, 411 U. S. 164, 170-171 (1973), that "[s]tate 
laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an In-
dian reservation except where Congress has expressly pro-
vided that state laws apply'' (quoting U. S. Dept. of the Inte-
rior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958)). Our cases, however, l 
have ~blished an inflexible per se rule precluding state 
jurisdiction over tr1 es r1 a mem ers in the absence of 
11 SeeS. Rep. No. 99-493, p. 2 (1986). Federal law enforcement officers 
have the capability to respond to violations of OCCA on Indian reserva-
tions, as is apparent from Farris and Dakota. This is not a situation where 
the unavailability of a federal officer at a particular moment would likely 
result in nonenforcement. OCCA is directed at large scale gambling en-
terprises. If State officers discover a gambling business unknown to fed-
eral authorities while performing their duties authorized by Pub. L. 280, 
there should be ample time for them to inform federal authorities, who 
would then determine whether investigation or other enforcement action 
was appropriate. A federal police officer is assigned by the Department of 
the Interior to patrol the Indian reservations in southern California. App. 
to Brief for Appellees 1d-7d. 
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express congressional consent. 16 "[U]nder certain circum-
stances a State may validly assert authority over the activi-
ties of nonmembers on a reservation, and . . . in exceptional 
circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-
reservation activities of tribal members." New Mexico v. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 331-332 (1983). 
Both Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 
U. S. 463 (1976), and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980), are il-
lustrative. In those decisions we held that, in the absence of 
express congressional permission, a state could require tribal 
smokeshops on Indian reservations to collect state sales tax 
11 In the special area of state taxation of Indian tribes and tribal mem-
bers, we have adopted a per se rule. In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 
U. S. 759 (1985), we held that Montana could not tax the Tribe's royalty 
interests in oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees under the Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938. We stated: "In keeping with its plenary au-
thority over Indian affairs, Congress can authorize the imposition of state 
taxes on Indian tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often, 
and the Court consistently has held that it will find the Indians' exemption 
from state taxes lifted only when Congress has made its intention to do so 
unmistakably clear." Id., at 765. We have repeatedly addressed the 
issue of state taxation of tribes and tribal members and the state, federal 
and tribal interests which it implicates. We have recognized that the fed-
eral tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and 
that the state interest in taxation is correspondingly weak. Accordingly, 
it is unnecessary to rebalance these interests in every case. In Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones , 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973), we distinguished state 
taxation from other assertions of state jurisdiction. We acknowledged 
that we had made repeated statements "to the effect that, even on reserva-
tions, state laws may be applied unless such application would interfere 
with reservation self-government or would impair a right granted or re-
served by federal law . .. . Even so, in the special area of state taxation, 
absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there 
has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or 
Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the res-
ervation, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra, lays to 
rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissi-
ble absent congressional consent." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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from their non-Indian customers. Both cases involved non-
members entering and purchasing tobacco products on the 
reservations involved. The state's interest in assuring the 
collection of sales taxes from non-Indians enjoying the off-
reservation services of the state was sufficient to warrant the 
minimal burden imposed on the tribal smokeshop operators. 
This case also involves a state burden on tribal Indians in 
the context of their dealings wth non-Indians since the ques-
tion is whether the State may prevent the Tribes from mak-
ing available high stakes bingo games to non-Indians coming 
from outside the reservations. Decision in this case turns on 
whether state authority is pre-empted by the operation of 
federal law; and "[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted . . . if it 
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests 
reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake 
are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." 
Mescalero, supra, at 333, 334. The inquiry is to proceed in 
light of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the con-
gressional goal of Indian self-government, including its 
"overriding goal" of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and 
economic development. I d., at 334-335. 17 See also, Iowa 
11 InN ew M erico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S., at 335, n. 17, we 
discussed a number of the statutes Congress enacted to promote tribal self-
government. The congressional declarations of policy in the Indian Fi-
nancing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., and in the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et 
seq., are particularly significant in this case: "It is hereby declared to be 
the policy of Congress ... to help develop and utilize Indian resources, 
both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise 
responsibility for the utilization and management of their own resources 
and where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive 
efforts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communi-
ties." 25 U. S. C. § 1451. Similarly, "[t]he Congress declares its commit-
ment to the maintenance of the Federal Government's unique and continu-
ing relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people through the 
establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will 
permit an orderly transition from Federal domination of programs for and 
services to Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian 
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Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, -- U. S. -- (1987); 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143 
(1980). 
These are important federal interests. They were reaf-
firmed by the President's 1983 Statement on Indian Policy.'8 
More specifically, the Department of the Interior, which has 
the primary responsibility for carrying out the Federal Gov-
ernment's trust obligations to Indian tribes, has sought to im-
plement these policies by promoting tribal bingo enter-
prises.19 Under the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 24 
U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., the Secretary of the Interior has 
made grants and has guaranteed loans for the purpose of con-
structing bingo facilities. See S. Rep. No. 99-493, p. 5 
people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and 
services." 25 U. S. C. § 450a(b). 
11 "It is important to the concept of self government that tribes reduce 
their dependence on federal funds by providing a greater percentage of the 
cost of their self government." 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. (Jan. 24, 
1983). 
11 The Court of Appeals relied on the following official declarations. 783 
F. 2d, at 904-905. A policy directive issued by the Assistant Secretary of 
the Interior on March 2, 1983, stated that the Department would "strongly 
oppose" any proposed legislation that would subject tribes or tribal mem-
bers to state gambling regulation. "Such a proposal is inconsistent with 
the President's Indian Policy Statement of January 24, 1983 ... . Anum-
ber of tribes have begun to engage in bingo and similar gambling opera-
tions on their reservations for the very purpose enunciated in the Presi-
dent's Message. Given the often limited resources which tribes have for 
revenue-producing activities, it is believed that this kind of revenue-pro-
ducing possibility should be protected and enhanced." The court also re-
lied on an affidavit submitted by the Director of Indian Services, Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, on behalf of the Tribes' position: 
"It is the department's position that tribal bingo enterprises are an ap-
propriate means by which tribes can further their economic self-suffi-
ciency, the economic development of reservations and tribal self-deter-
mination. All of these are federal goals for the tribes. Furthennore, it is 
the Department's position that the development of tribal bingo enterprises 
is consistent with and in furtherance of President Reagan's Indian Policy 
Statement of January 24, 1983." 
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(1986); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. 
Supp. 245, 246 (D. Conn. 1986). The Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development and the Department of Health 
and Human Services have also provided financial assistance 
to develop tribal gaming enterprises. See S. Rep. 99-493, 
p. 5 (1986). Here, the Secretary of the Interior has ap-
proved tribal ordinances establishing and regulating the gam-
ing activities involved. See H. R. No. 99-488, p. 10 (1986). 
The Secretary has also exercised his authority to review 
tribal bingo management contracts under 25 U. S. C. §81, 
and has isstled detailed guidelines governing that review. 20 
App. to Motion to Dismiss Appeal or Affirm Judgment, 
63a-70a. 
These policies and actions, which demonstrate the govern-
ment's approval and active promotion of tribal bingo enter-
prises, are of particular relevance in this case. The Cabazon 
and Morongo Reservations contain no natural resources 
which can be exploited. The tribal games at present provide 
the sole source of revenues for the operation of the tribal gov-
ernments and the provision of tribal services. They are also 
the major sources of employment on the reservations. Self-
determination and economic development are not within 
reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and provide em-
ployment for their members. The Tribes' interests obvi-
ously parallel the federal interests. 
20 Among other things, the guidelines require that the contract state that 
no payments have been made or will be made to any elected member of the 
tribal government or relative of such member for the purpose of obtaining 
or maintaining the contract. The contractor is required to disclose in-
formation on all parties in interest to the contract and all employees who 
will have day-to-day management responsibility for the gambling opera-
tion, including names, home and business addresses, occupations, dates of 
birth, and Social Security numbers. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
must conduct a name and record check on these persons before a contract 
may be approved. The guidelines also specify accounting procedures and 
cash management procedures which the contractor must follow. 
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California seeks to diminish the weight of these seemingly 
important tribal interests by asserting that the tribes are 
merely marketing an exemption from state gambling laws. 
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U. S., at 155, we held that the state could 
tax cigarettes sold by tribal smokeshops to non-Indians, even 
though it would eliminate their competitive advantage and 
substantially reduce revenues used to provide tribal services, 
because the tribes had no right "to market an exemption from 
state taxation to persons who would normally do their busi-
ness elsewhere." We stated that "[i]t is painfully apparent 
that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons com-
ing from outside is not generated on the reservations by ac-
tivities in which the Tribes have a significant interest." 
Ibid. Here, however, the Tribes are not merely importing a 
product onto the reservations for immediate resale to non-In-
dians. They have built modern facilities which provide rec-
reational opportunities and ancillary services to their pa-
trons, who do not simply drive onto the reservations, make 
purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of time 
there enjoying the services the Tribes provide. The Tribes 
have strong incentive to provide comfortable, clean and at-
tractive facilities and well-run games in order to increase at-
tendance at the games. 21 The tribal bingo enterprises are 
similar to the resort complex, featuring hunting and fishing, 
that the Mescalero Apache Tribe operates on its reservation 
21 An agent of the California Bureau of Investigation visited the Cabazon 
bingo parlor as part of an investigation of tribal bingo enterprises. The 
agent described the clientele as follows: 
"In attendance for the Monday evening bingo session were about 300 play-
ers .. . . On row 5, on the front left side were a middle-aged latin couple, 
who were later joined by two young latin males. These men had to have 
the game explained to them. The middle table was shared with a senior 
citizen couple. The aisle table had 2 elderly women, 1 in a wheelchair, and 
a middle-aged woman. . . . A goodly portion of the crowd were retired 
age to senior citizens." App. 176. We are unwilling to assume that these 
patrons would be indifferent to the services offered by the Tribes. 
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through the "concerted and sustained" management of res-
ervation land and wildlife resources. New Mexico v. M esca-
lero Apache Tribe, supra, at 341. The Mescalero project 
generates funds for essential tribal services and provides em-
ployment for tribal members. We there rejected the notion 
that the tribe is merely marketing an exemption from state 
hunting and fishing regulations and concluded that New Mex-
ico could not regulate on-reservation fishing and hunting by 
non-Indians. Ibid. Similarly, the Cabazon and Morongo 
Bands are generating value on the reservations through ac-
tivities in which they have a substantial interest. 
The State also relies on Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713 
(1983), in which we held that California could require a tribal 
member and a federally-licensed Indian trader operating a 
general store on a reservation to obtain a state license in 
order to sell liquor for off-premises consumption. But our 
decision there rested on the grounds that Congress had never 
recognized any sovereign tribal interest in regulating liquor 
traffic and that Congress, historically, had plainly anticipated 
that the states would exercise concurrent authority to regu-
late the use and distribution of liquor on Indian reservations. 
There is no such traditional federal view governing the out-
come of this case, since, as we have explained, the current 
federal policy is to promote precisely what California seeks to 
prevent 
sole interest serted by the State to justify the impo-
siti n of its bing aws on e r1 es is in preventing the infil-
trati f ribal games by organized crime. To the ex-
tent that the State seeks to prevent any and all bingo games 
from being played on tribal lands while permitting regulated, 
off-reservation games, this asserted interest is irrelevant and 
the State and County laws are pre-empted. See supra n. 3. 
Even to the extent that the State and County seek to regu-
late short of prohibition, the laws are pre-empted. The 
State insists that the high stakes offered at tribal games are 
attractive to organized crime, whereas the controlled games 
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authorized under California law are not. This is surely a le-
gitimate concern, but we are unconvinced that it is sufficient 
to escape the pre-emptive force of federal and tribal interests 
apparent in this case. California does not allege any present 
criminal involvement in the Cabazon and Morongo enter-
prises, and the Ninth Circuit discerned none. 783 F. 2d, at 
904. An official of the Department of Justice has expressed 
some concern about tribal bingo operations, 22 but far from any 
action being taken evidencing this concern-and surely the 
Federal Government has the authority to forbid Indian gam-
bling enterprises-the prevailing federal policy continues to 
support these tribal enterprises, including those of the Tribes 
involved in this case. 
We conclude that the State's interest in preventing the in-
filtration of the tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime 
does not · t · state re ation of the tribal bingo enter-
prises in light of the COI!!Pel · !8" federal and tribal interests 
supporting them. State regulation would impermiSsibly in-
fringe on tribal government, and this conclusion applies 
equally to the County's attempted regulation of the Cabazon 
card club. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
22 Hearings on H. R. 4566 before the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 98th Cong. , 2d Seas. (1984); App. 197-205. 
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No. 85-1708, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians 
This opinion displays a thorough knowledge of the Court's 
Indian cases. I am disturbed by its failure to adopt a determi-
nate rule of law, but that seems to be the general approach in 
this area. 
1. Jurisdiction. The jurisdictional question is disposed of 
in a footnote. P. 3, n. 4. The issue is whether the state law 
and the local ordinance were held to violate the Supremacy Clause 
as applied to the reservations. I was inclined to dismiss the 
appeal, but I admit this was mostly due to a general hostility to 
appeals, particularly appeals in Indian cases. This case is dif-
ferent from Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 u.s. 238 (1984), 
because the lower cts did discuss the gambling statutes. More-
over, on several occasions the Court has accepted appellate ju-
risdiction when state cts have held that state laws are applica-
ble on Indian reservations. "Symmetry" suggests that there is 
appellate jurisdiction here as well. I conclude, reluctantly, 
that this is a proper appeal. The Court seems destined to have a 
certain number of Indian cases on its docket! 
page 2. 
2. P.L. 280. I think it unfortunate that the opinion relies 
so heavily on the supposed distinction between "civil/regula tory" 
and "criminal/prohibitory" laws. It seems to me there is no way 
to tell whether California "prohibits" certain forms of gambling, 
such as stud poker, or merely "regulates" gambling activities by 
allowing draw poker, etc. The opinion admits that the distinc-
tion is not a bright line, and that "an argument of some weight 
may be made that the bingo statute is prohibitory." P. 6. The 
opinion concludes that this Court is "reluctant to disagree" with 
CA9's view of the nature of the state law. It seems to me, how-
ever, that if any deference is due on this question, it is due to 
the State Attorney General's interpretation of state law. JUS-
TICE WHITE's clerk makes the valid point that the statute itself 
dist'inguishes between criminal and civil activities. I had orig-
inally thought that a better ground for deciding this case would 
be a holding that state and local laws cannot be applied directly 
to the tribes without the consent of Congress. But this is not a 
hard-and-fast rule either--the Court has held that the states may 
collect sales tax on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians. 
In sum, I think the analysis in the opinion is not very sat-
isfying, but I have nothing better to offer. 
--------------------~,----~'-- ~~-3. Organized Crime Control Act. We agree that this statute  
is basically irrelevant. The opinion relies primarily on the 
~
federal role in enforcing this statute, and the lack of federal 
enforcement efforts against tribal bingo operations. ------------. I might 
have given more prominence to the absence of references to Indian 
gambling in the legislative history, and the specific exemption 
page 3. 
for charitable bingo games. Still, I think this part of the 
opinion is completely adequate. 
4. The opening paragraph of the discussion, p. 3, speaks in 
terms of tribal sovereignty. As I read the more recent cases, 
the Court has tended to rely on a "special" type of preemption 
analysis that takes into account traditional notions of tribal 
sovereignty. I fail to see the significance in this subtle dis-
tinction, but mention it only because it may be a subject of com-
ment by some other Justices. 
On balance, I recommend that you simply join. 
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